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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyse the responses by general practitioners to 
promotional activities for pharmaceuticals by pharmaceutical companies. Promotion can be 
beneficial for society as a means of providing information, but it can also be harmful in the 
sense that it lowers price sensitivity of doctors and it merely is a means of establishing market 
share, even when cheaper, therapeutically equivalent drugs are available. A model is estimated 
that includes interactions of promotion expenditures and prices and that explicitly exploits the 
panel structure of the data, allowing for drug specific effects and dynamic adjustments, or habit 
persistence. The data used are aggregate monthly GP prescriptions per drug together with 
monthly outlays on drug promotion for the period 1994-1999 for 11 therapeutic markets, 
covering more than half of the total prescription drug market in the Netherlands. Identification 
of price effects is obtained by the introduction of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act, which 
established that Dutch drugs prices became a weighted average of the prices in surrounding 
countries after June 1996. We conclude that, on average, GP drug price sensitivity is small, but 
adversely affected by promotion. 
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Summary 
Pharmaceutical companies spend large sums of money on the promotion of their products. In an 
absolute sense this is not surprising, since the pharmaceutical sector is very large: in 1996, 1.2% 
of GDP in industrialised countries was spent on pharmaceuticals. But pharmaceutical promotion 
outlays are large in a relative sense as well. In the entire economy, firms spend an average of 
2% of their revenues on promotion. For pharmaceutical firms this percentage is much higher; 
estimates imply that around 15%-25% of their revenues are spent on promotion. 
In many countries insurance or tax systems are in place such that the consumer of 
pharmaceutical products does not bear the full direct costs of pharmaceutical consumption. In 
the country under study in this paper, the Netherlands, the drugs prescribing decision is made 
by a general practitioner (GP) or specialist. The financial incentives for doctors to prescribe 
cheap drugs if they are available as an alternative are very weak. Together with a general 
insurance system, the price elasticity of demand for drugs is therefore expected to be small. 
As physicians are the main decision-makers, most of pharmaceutical companies’ promotion 
activities are directed to general practitioners and specialists. As large promotion outlays in a 
market with inelastic demand will lead to higher prices, it is important to assess the welfare 
aspects of pharmaceutical companies’ marketing activities. 
Promotion can have two effects on demand: it may shift the demand curve outwards as 
doctors prescribe more of the advertised drug and it may rotate the demand curve as demand 
becomes less or more price-elastic than before. In general, if product promotion lowers the price 
sensitivity, this will inhibit price competition and will lead to higher prices, thus harming social 
welfare. An outward shift of the demand curve for a drug could be socially desirable if this drug 
truly improves health at a reasonable cost. However, if promotion is merely a means of 
establishing market share, even when cheaper, therapeutically equivalent drugs are available, 
the promotion efforts may be socially harmful. 
Using a unique data set that contains monthly information on demand, prices and promotion 
outlays for a large number of prescription drugs in the Netherlands during the years 1994-1999, 
a model is estimated to test whether promotion expenditures have an effect on the demand of 
pharmaceuticals. 
Indeed, we find that promotion expenditures rotate the demand curve and adversely affect 
the own-price elasticity of drugs, reducing a potentially small negative price elasticity to almost 
zero. Thus the promotional expenditures make doctors less sensitive to prices when deciding 
which pharmaceutical should be described. Identification of the promotion effect on the price 
elasticity of demand is due to the introduction of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act, which 
established that Dutch drugs prices became a weighted average of the prices in the surrounding 
countries. This act came into effect in June 1996 and established that prices and promotion 
expenditures could no longer be set simultaneously by the drug producers.   
  8 
We also find that promotion expenditures shift the demand curve outwards, indicating that a 
sizeable proportion of promotion efforts is about establishing or maintaining market share. A 
long run result we find is that if all companies increase total promotion outlays with 1% then 
total pharmaceutical consumption increases with about 0.2%. From this result we can, however, 
not conclude that the outward shift in the demand curve is socially harmful. To make such a 
conclusion we would need additional information, such as the optimum level of pharmaceutical 
consumption.    
Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and the exclusion of new products 
from the analysis.  
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1  Introduction 
Pharmaceutical companies spend large sums of money on the promotion of their products. In an 
absolute sense this is not surprising, since the pharmaceutical sector is very large: in 1996, 1.2% 
of GDP in industrialised countries was spent on pharmaceuticals. But pharmaceutical promotion 
outlays are large in a relative sense as well. In the entire economy, firms spend an average of 
2% of their revenues on promotion. For pharmaceutical firms this percentage is much higher: 
estimates imply that around 15%-25% of their revenues are spent on promotion (Jacobzone, 
2000; Rosenthal et al. 2003; Scherer, 2000). 
In many countries insurance or tax systems are in place such that the consumer of 
pharmaceutical products does not bear the full direct costs of drugs’ consumption. In the 
country under study in this paper, the Netherlands, the drugs prescribing decision is made by a 
general practitioner (GP) or specialist. The financial incentives for doctors to prescribe cheap 
drugs if they are available as an alternative are very weak. Together with a general insurance 
system, the price elasticity of demand for drugs is therefore expected to be small. 
As physicians are the main decision-makers and pharmaceutical promotion directed at 
consumers is not allowed in the Netherlands, most of pharmaceutical companies’ promotion 
activities are directed to general practitioners and specialists. As large promotion outlays in a 
market with inelastic demand will lead to higher prices, it is important to assess the welfare 
aspects of pharmaceutical companies’ marketing activities.
1  Using a unique data set that 
contains monthly information on demand, prices and promotion outlays for a large number of 
prescription drugs in the Netherlands during the years 1994-1999, a model is estimated based 
on the model as proposed by Rizzo (1999) in order to test whether promotion expenditure 
lowers the price sensitivity of demand for pharmaceutical products. In general, if product 
promotion lowers the price sensitivity, this will inhibit price competition and will lead to higher 
prices, thus harming social welfare. 
To our knowledge, this question has only been addressed directly by Rizzo (1999) and 
Gönül et al. (2001), who arrive at opposite conclusions. Rizzo (1999) finds that promotion 
decreases the price elasticity in the market for anti-hypertensives in the US, whereas Gönül et 
al. (2001) find that promotion outlays can increase the price elasticity for drugs for an 
undisclosed specific therapeutic state. In the latter case promotion, on average, merely provides 
information about a product’s characteristic and its price. 
Our data characteristics differ from those of Rizzo (1999) and Gönül et al. (2001) in the 
following way. First of all, our data cover 11 therapeutic markets instead of one. Together these 
markets constitute more than 50% of the total Dutch prescription drug market, which makes it 
easier to formulate policy implications (see De Laat et al., 2002). Secondly, a major cause of 
price variation is the fact that in 1996 the Dutch government introduced a new law for the price 
 
1 See Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Rizzo (1999), Matraves (1999) and Scherer (2000) for good general discussions of the 
interactions between promotion expenditures, R&D and market structure in the pharmaceutical industry.  
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setting of prescription drugs. In June 1996, price caps were determined using neighbouring 
countries as references. This resulted in quite large exogenous decreases in drug prices of about 
15% on average and large changes in relative prices. Price variation from June 1996 onwards 
mostly reflected exchange rate variation between the Netherlands and the UK. Thirdly, since 
Coscelli (2000) finds habit persistence to be an important attribute in these type of markets, the 
empirical model incorporates the possibility of habit persistence of patients and GPs by 
including past aggregate prescription behaviour. 
The estimation results indicate that price sensitivity of general practitioners in the 
Netherlands is very small, but that promotion outlays did have a negative impact on the price 
responsiveness. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews in detail the market for prescription 
drugs, describes which promotion activities are used by the pharmaceutical industry and 
discusses the various welfare aspects of promotion by pharmaceutical companies. Section 3 
details the Dutch health care insurance system and prescription drugs’ price setting. Section 4 
presents the data and in Section 5 the empirical analysis is presented. Section 6 concludes. 
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2  Drugs Markets, Promotion Activities and Welfare 
Implications 
Innovation and patenting play a central role in the supply of drugs. Price-cost margins for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are high on average. Demand side characteristics such as 
intermediation by physicians, insurance coverage and low price elasticities interact with the 
presence of monopoly power on the supply side, due to patenting and brand loyalty, to support 
prices that commonly exceed drug production costs by a substantial margin. Among 459 four-
digit manufacturing industries covered by the US census in 1987, pharmaceuticals had the 
sixth-highest price/cost margin at 61.4%. The average for all manufacturing industries was 
30.5% (Scherer, 2000). According to Public Citizen (2001), Fortune magazine’s rankings show 
that the pharmaceutical industry has been the most profitable in the USA in every year since 
1982. 
A justification for the high profitability of the pharmaceutical industry is generally believed 
to be the large risks associated with pharmaceutical R&D. An often cited number (based on a 
study by DiMasi et al., 1991) is that on average $500 million of R&D outlays are needed before 
one successful new drug can be marketed.
2 
It is important to note that there is not just one pharmaceutical market, but around a hundred 
different ones. Firms do not compete with each other within the total pharmaceutical market, 
but within therapeutic markets, defined by afflictions. Examples of such therapeutic markets are 
the markets for drugs against ulcers, hypertension and depression. Within these therapeutic 
markets substitutability of one product for another exists, but between such markets 
substitutability is low. 
If there is competition between therapeutically substitutable drugs, the quality of the drug is 
an important decision factor. The quality of a drug is multi-faceted, the important characteristics 
are efficacy, safety, side effects and ease of use. In the early stages of the product life of a drug, 
when it is protected by a patent, its only competitors are drugs with different active ingredients. 
These therapeutic substitutes may differ in their efficacy, safety characteristics and side effects. 
After expiration of the patent, other producers can enter the market with generic copies of the 
drug. In general, prices of generic copies are lower than the branded precursor. 
It is clear that there is an important role for promotion in the market for pharmaceuticals. 
Because another company may introduce a better drug and because the patent period is limited, 
the period to earn back the R&D (and other) investments is limited. Therefore, drug producers 
have to make sure that their products reach high sales levels as soon as possible. 
 
Data on total promotion outlays by the pharmaceutical industry are scarce. Scherer (2000) 
reports that total prescription drug advertising and promotion outlays in the US market during 
1997 were estimated to be $12 billion, or 18 percent of pharmaceutical sales. Rosenthal et al. 
 
2 In a report, Public Citizen (2001) brings this estimate down to $110 million.  
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(2003) report promotion to sales ratios of 13%-16% in the US during 1996-2000. Other 
available data represent marketing outlays, which are somewhat broader than promotion. In 
particular, distribution costs are typically included in marketing figures. OECD figures 
(Jacobzone, 2000) show that in 1989 research-oriented drug firms spent 24% of sales on 
marketing. This makes the pharmaceutical industry one of the biggest spenders on promotion. 
In contrast, these firms spent 13% of sales on R&D. 
Pharmaceutical companies use many instruments to influence the prescribing decisions 
made by general practitioners. Of these, detailing (where a representative of the company pays a 
visit to the GP) is the most important way of communicating with and informing GPs about a 
drug’s performance. Other promotion activities aimed at GPs are advertising in medical 
journals, direct mail, so-called post marketing research (PMR) programs and continuing 
medical education (CME) events. 
 
Promotion can have two effects on demand: it may shift the demand curve outwards as doctors 
prescribe more of the advertised drug and/or it may rotate the demand curve as demand 
becomes less or more price-elastic than before. In general, if product promotion lowers the price 
sensitivity, this will inhibit price competition and will lead to higher prices, thus harming social 
welfare. An outward shift of the demand curve for a drug could be socially desirable if this drug 
truly improves health at a reasonable cost. However, if promotion is merely a means of 
establishing market share, even when cheaper, therapeutically equivalent drugs are available, 
the promotion efforts may be socially harmful.  
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3  The Dutch Health Care System and Drugs Price Setting 
The Dutch health care system is a mixture of public and private funding. At the individual level, 
a person is covered by and contributes directly to public insurance when her income is below a 
certain threshold. Above the threshold, an individual can choose to obtain cover from a private 
insurer, which practically all private insured persons do. 
The Dutch pharmaceutical reimbursement system clusters products into small groups of close 
substitutes. The maximum reimbursement price within a group is a weighted average of the 
prices of the products in the group at some baseline date. Patients who receive prescriptions for 
products with a price exceeding its limit have to pay the difference out-of-pocket. Products 
without close substitutes (typically new products) are not clustered and do not have a maximum 
reimbursement price. Upon introduction of the system in 1991 most product prices in excess of 
the limit were lowered to this limit. The same happened in 1999 when the limits were 
recalculated with new baseline prices. As a result, the amount of co-payment is very low: 0.6% 
in 2000. More than 40% of these co-payments were for hormonal contraceptives (GIP/CVZ, 
2002). 
During the period over which we have data (1994-1999), there have been some major price 
reforms in the Netherlands. The most important one was the Pharmaceutical Prices Act that 
came into effect in June 1996. From then, the maximum price for a drug was established as an 
average of the prices of the drug in Germany, France, UK, and Belgium. As drug prices were 
traditionally quite high in the Netherlands as compared to the surrounding countries, the 
Pharmaceutical Prices Act resulted in considerably lower drug prices in general (on average by 
about 15%). Prices of products without a reimbursement price were affected the most by the 
new act, but also many clustered products (including generics) were forced to lower their prices. 
An important driver for exogenous price fluctuations after the introduction of the 
Pharmaceutical Prices Act is the British Pound - Dutch Guilder exchange rate. The relative 
weight of the UK then determines the relative price fluctuations of drugs within a market. 
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4  Data 
 
The monthly data on prescriptions by GPs and associated costs were obtained from the Health 
Insurance Board.
3 The data are taken from 9 public insurance funds and extrapolated to cover 
the whole of the Netherlands. From IMS Health, promotion expenditure per drug has been 
obtained.
4  The promotion expenditure is subdivided into three categories: detailing, advertising 
and direct mail. Within this total, these three groups account for approximately 63%, 25% and 
12% of marketing expenditure respectively. Not all promotion activities by pharmaceutical 
firms are included in the data. Promotion activities related to courses, sponsorships, promotion 
events, opinion leaders etc. are not included in our dataset.   
Markets 
The data collected were for drugs in the following 11 therapeutic markets: pharmaceuticals 
against hypertension, ulcers, cholesterol, pregnancy (oral contraceptives), depression,
5  
rheumatism, migraine, anxiety, asthma, sleeping disorders and allergies. Together these markets 
account for 58% of the total prescription drugs market in terms of market value, and 55% in 
terms of the promotion expenditures in the IMS Health database.  
Demand is measured in Defined Daily Doses (DDD), which is a standard measure 
determined by the World Health Organization that indicates the typical daily dosage of a drug 
for standard treatment. 
A common feature of drug markets is that of parallel importing, where branded drugs get 
imported from countries with lower (regulated) prices. Total demand of branded products 
includes parallel importing, and prices are weighted averages. In general, prices per DDD are 
the ratio of total cost to total number of DDDs prescribed per month. 
A Graphical Analysis 
Before we turn to the empirical analysis to address the central question of this paper, we 
examine the data regarding some general, descriptive issues. We focus on the markets of anti-
hypertensives, anti-ulcer drugs, cholesterol lowering drugs and anti-depressants. The first two 
markets are the largest in size in terms of sales (in each market around 290 million euros in 
1999) whereas cholesterol medication is a large market (around 180 million euros in 1999) 
which has had the largest growth rate over the period. The market for anti-depressants is smaller 
(around 115 million euros in December 1999),
6 but spending on the observed marketing 
 
3 Genees- en hulpmiddelen Informatie Project / College voor Zorgverzekeringen, Diemen. 
4 Medische Promotie Index, IMS HEALTH Nederland b.v., the Hague. Note that not all promotion activities by 
pharmaceutical firms are included in the data. Promotion activities related to courses, sponsorships, promotion events, 
opinion leaders etc. are not included in the dataset.   
5 The data on anti-depressants and anxiety drugs were collected from February 1995 onwards. 
6 For more descriptive statistics, see De Laat et. al. (2002).  
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activities is high in this market: in the observation period on average 6.5% of sales with a 
maximum of 12%. 
 
Figures 1-4 show the movements of the average prices for the four markets over time. It is clear 
that the Pharmaceutical Prices Act that came into effect in June 1996, and is highlighted by a 
vertical line in the graphs, lowered the prices considerably in most cases. Note that the high 
average prices for anti-ulcer drugs at the end of the period are due to the introduction of 
Pantopac, which is quite expensive. 
 
Figures 5-8 depict market sizes over time in DDDs. All four markets expanded quite 
considerably during the period with the largest growth rate for cholesterol lowering drugs 
(annually 45% on average). 
 
Figures 9-12 show the ratios of total promotion expenditures to total sales for branded drugs in 
these markets. For the anti-ulcer drug market, the extra marketing expenditure due to the 
introduction of Pantopac in the last eight months of the observation period can be clearly 
observed. Similarly, for the cholesterol market, the increase in the promotion to sales ratio in 
October 1995 is due to the introduction of Lescol. The promotion to sales ratio is high for anti-
depressants at the beginning of the period, almost 12 %, but declines gradually over the period 
to about 4% at the end. 
 
How important are generic drugs? Figures 13-16 show the market shares of branded products 
versus generic drugs. Apart from the cholesterol market, generic drugs have increased their 
market shares over time. The steep increase in the market share of generics in the market for 
anti-hypertensive drugs between July 1996 and April 1997 is due to the introduction of the 
generic ACE inhibitor captopril that challenged the position of the name-brand Capoten. In 
January 1999 another generic anti-hypertensive drug was brought to market, bumetanide. 
 
Figures 17 and 18 display the demand and prices for the anti-ulcer drug Zantac and the generic 
Ranitidine, which is responsible for the large increase in market share of generic drugs in the 
market for anti-ulcer drugs. The price difference between the two drugs is actually quite small.
7  
Figures 19 and 20 show a different picture for Adalat, a pharmaceutical against hypertension, 
which had generic competition throughout the period. This name-brand drug kept its market 
share relative to the generic even though the price of the generic was lower. 
 
 
7 This small price differential between name-brand and generic is typical for the Dutch prescription drug market. Generic 
producers keep consumer prices high to offer high margins to pharmacists, who are the decision makers regarding which 
generic is delivered. A pharmacist can supply a generic if the GP does not specifically prescribe the name-brand drug.  
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5  Empirical Analysis 
In order to estimate the effects of promotion expenditures on physicians’ prescribing behaviour 
and especially their impact on GP’s price sensitivity, a model is estimated that is similar in 
spirit to that proposed by Rizzo (1999) and specified as: 
  it i it
itj itj itj it
it it it it
t i t i it
x
promsc promfc pc proms
proms promf p proms
q q q
e g b
a a a a
a a a a
r r
+ + ¢ +
+ + ´ + +
+ + ´ + +
+ + = - -
ln ln ln ) ln (
ln ln ln ) ln (
ln ln ln
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
2 , 2 1 , 1
 
where  it q  is demand measured in DDDs for drug i, i = 1,…, N , in month t, t = 1,…, T ;  it p is 
the price of drug i in month t ; it promf  is the monthly promotion expenditure; it proms is the 
stock of promotion expenditure (to capture delayed effects of promotion, see below);  itj pc  is 
the average price of competing drugs in market j, where markets are defined by ATC3 codes;
8    
itj promfc and itj promsc  are the promotion expenditures for competing drugs; it x contains 
several auxiliary variables, including drug specific characteristics, like age, but also year and 
month indicators. The i g are drug specific intercepts that will control for unobservable perceived 
quality differences between drugs that are constant over time. It is important to allow for this 
type of quality effects, as it is likely that prices and quality are correlated. 
 
The interaction between the drug’s own price and promotion expenditures enables one to test 
for the effect of promotion expenditure on price elasticity. If  0 2 > a  ( 0 6 < a ), then promotion 
adversely affects the own (cross) price elasticity of a drug, provided that reverse causation can 
be ruled out. After all, it may well be the case that  2 a  is larger than zero because advertising 
expenditure can be more profitable for drugs that are relatively price inelastic, as a monopolist 
sets price and promotion expenditure simultaneously, see Dorfman and Steiner (1954). In 
addition to robustness checks we performed to rule out reverse causation, the introduction of the 
Pharmaceutical Prices Act helps to identify the promotion effect, as the price setting for the 
Netherlands no longer reflects the price elasticity/promotion expenditure tradeoff of the 
monopolist. Not only is it likely that price elasticities for drugs are different in the Netherlands 
than in the surrounding countries (drug consumption per capita has historically been much 
lower in the Netherlands), the UK, for example, imposes restrictions on price setting and 
promotion via the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. The result of this policy feeds 
through into the Dutch prices by the Pharmaceutical Prices Act. Further, most of the price 
 
8 ATC stands for Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical. Each drug is classified by its ATC3, ATC4 and ATC5 codes. For example, 
within the class of anti-hypertensive drugs, the ATC3 codes C09A and C09B constitute the ACE inhibitors. The ATC4 codes 
C09AA, C09BA and C09BB are the ACE inhibitors proper, ACE inhibitors in combination with diuretics, and ACE inhibitors in 
combination with calcium channel antagonists, respectively. Finally, the ATC5 code defines the molecule, for example 
C09AA01 is captopril.  
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variation after the introduction of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act is due to fluctuations in the 
exchange rate between the British Pound and the Dutch Guilder, which is an exogenous 
variation. 
 
A difference with the model of Rizzo (1999) is the fact that lags of the dependent variable are 
included in the model. These take account of the fact that there may be habit persistence/brand 
loyalty among GPs, or that it is for example not easy to change repeat prescriptions immediately 
after a price change or a promotion expenditure increase for an alternative drug. Further, we 
have included an interaction of  pc ln and  proms ln  to allow for promotion expenditure to affect 
the cross-price elasticity. 
A second difference with Rizzo’s model is the way the initial stock of promotion 
expenditures is constructed. Both Rizzo’s and our model defines the promotion stock as: 
 
  it t i m it promf proms proms + - = -1 , ) 1 ( d , 
 
where  m d is the monthly depreciation rate of promotion expenditure. The problem with this 
construction of the stock variable is that most products covered in the data set are already in 
existence when the observation period starts in January 1994, and promotion expenditures prior 
to 1994 are not known to us. For these products we need to construct an initial stock of 
promotion expenditures. Rizzo (1999) constructed the initial promotion expenditure stock by 
assuming that promotion expenditures in the years prior to observation are the same as in the 
first year of observation. As the life-cycle pattern of promotion expenditures for drugs shows 
that more promotion expenditure is done at the introduction of a drug than later in its life, see 
Figure 21, this procedure is likely to underestimate the initial promotion expenditure stock. We 
therefore estimate the simple model 
 
  iy iy i iy v age promf + + = 1 0 q q , 
 
where  iy promf  is the promotion expenditure for drug i in year y , and  iy age is the age of the 
drug in years. We then use the estimates of this model to estimate the initial stock of promotion 
expenditure, calibrating the drug specific intercept in such a way that the promotion 
expenditures in the first year of observation are predicted exactly.
9 
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y j i i mf o pr ms o pr d ; 
) 4652 ( 34047 ˆ , ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1994 , 1 1994 , 1 = - = - = + = se age promf age mf o pr i i i iy i iy q q t q t  where  1993 / 12 , ˆ i ms o pr  is the estimated stock of 
promotion expenditure in December 1993, and y d is the annual depreciation rate of promotion expenditures, estimation of 
which is discussed below.  
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Estimation Results 
The model is estimated on a sub-sample of drugs that did not experience generic competition.
10  
If generic competition was introduced during the observation period, only the pre-generic 
competition period for the drug is included in the sample. This is done because market 
conditions for drugs that experience generic competition are completely different from those 
that do not, as was made clear in the graphical analysis in Section 4. 
Table 1 presents OLS estimation results. The sample consists of 140 branded drugs, with a 
total of 7044 observations, as the panel is unbalanced. Variables that are further included in the 
model but that are not presented in the tables are drug specific dummies, year and month 
dummies,
11  dummies for the period of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act and two further differing, 
more minor, price regimes, a dummy measuring whether a drug required co-payment, and if so 
the log of the amount of co-payment.
12  All variables that are measured in logs were set equal to 
zero when their levels were equal to zero, and dummies were included when this was the case. 
The annual discount rate for promotion expenditure  y d , with its associated monthly rate  m d , is 
obtained by minimising the residual sum of squares by means of a grid search using multiples 
of 0.05. 
 
The first two columns of Table 1 present the results of the model that does not include 
interactions of promotion expenditures and prices. It is clear that the prescription drugs series 
are quite persistent with the coefficients on lagged prescriptions summing up to 0.82.
13 This 
means that there is a strong habit persistence/brand loyalty, and that any changes due to 
changing prices and/or changing promotion efforts take some time to be fully established. The 
estimated coefficients on own and competitor’s prices are the short run elasticities and are 
found to be not significantly different from zero. The stock of promotion expenditures has a 
positive effect on demand, whereas competitor’s promotion efforts have a negative effect. The 
promotion expenditure annual depreciation rate y d is found to be 0.55. 
Table 2 presents the long-run, steady state elasticities in response to permanent changes. The 
steady state own price elasticity in the model without interactions is given by  ) 1 /( 2 1 1 r r a - - .             
The steady-state own promotion expenditure in this model is given by ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 4 3 r r a a - - +          
as a steady-state permanent 1% increase in  promf  results in a permanent 1% increase in 
proms . The long-run own- and cross price elasticities are not significantly different from zero. 
The own promotion effect is 0.30 (s.e. 0.03), whereas the competitors’ promotion effect is –0.12  
 
10 For some drugs, the price variation was unrealistically volatile, probably due to measurement error. These drugs are 
removed from the analysis. 
11 Due to the very distinct seasonal pattern of anti-allergy drugs, separate month dummies were estimated for these drugs. 
12 As mentioned in Section 3, co-payments are uncommon: for the vast majority of drugs no co-payment is required. Co-
payments constitute only 0.6% of total drug costs in 2000, with more than 40% concentrated in one specific market, 
hormonal contraceptives (GIP/CVZ, 2002). Therefore data on co-payments alone could not be used to estimate price 
elasticities. 
13 Two lags of the dependent variable in the model proved to be sufficient to capture this effect: the model residuals do not 
display any further within drug autocorrelation.  
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(s.e. 0.04), indicating that a sizeable proportion of promotion efforts is about establishing or 
maintaining market share. 
From the results for the model with interactions, as presented in columns 3 and 4 in Table 1, 
it is clear that price elasticities are adversely affected by promotion expenditures, as  0 2 > a   
and  0 6 < a . For the model with interactions between prices and the stock of promotion 
expenditures, steady-state own price elasticities are reported at various quantiles of the 
distribution of  proms ln  in Table 2. It is – 0.26 at the 5th percentile of  proms ln , 0.12 at the 
median and 0.29 at the 95th percentile. Although these elasticities are estimated quite 
imprecisely, the gradient of the own-price elasticity is apparent. Estimates for the steady-state 
interaction terms  ) 1 /( 2 1 2 r r a - -  and  ) 1 /( 2 1 6 r r a - - are given by 0.088 (s.e. 0.031) and       
– 0.055 (s.e. 0.033) respectively. 
Robustness 
These findings are robust to allowing for separate levels of price elasticity per ATC3 group of 
drugs. The model was re-estimated with interactions between  p ln (and pc ln ) and ATC3 
classification dummies. Rizzo (1999) motivated this model for dealing with the Dorfman-
Steiner problem of joint determination of prices and promotion expenditures. Estimates for the 
steady-state interaction terms in this case are given by 0.105 (s.e. 0.038) and – 0.055 (s.e. 
0.037).  
 
Prices and promotion expenditures can be endogenously determined with respect to demand 
shocks at this aggregate level. The model was re-estimated by instrumental variables using 
lagged prices and promotion expenditures as instruments. The estimation results using this IV 
procedure were very similar to those as reported in Table 1 and are therefore not reported here. 
A Hausman test did not reject the null hypotheisis of exogeneity of the regressors (p-value 
0.38). 
 
The model has also been estimated for the 11 markets separately. Not all markets display the 
same promotion expenditure effects as found for the pooled sample. Tables 3 and 4 show the 
results for the Anti-Hypertension, Anti-Ulcer, Cholesterol and Anti-Depressant markets.
14 The 
results for the Anti-Hypertension, Anti-Ulcer and Cholesterol markets are broadly similar to 
those of the pooled sample, especially with respect to the signs of  2 a and  6 a . For the market of 
Anti-Depressants, promotion expenditures seem to have the effect of increasing the price 
sensitivity of GPs. However, a simple F-test for testing whether all parameters are the same in 
the 11 markets has a value of 0.1782, clearly not rejecting the null hypothesis and thus the 
pooled results.  
 
 
14 Keeping the value of the depreciation rate the same across markets as estimated in Table 1.  
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The estimation results as presented in Tables 1 and 2 were for branded products without generic 
competition, including products that appeared new on the market during our sample period. To 
check whether these new products, with relatively large promotion expenditures, had a 
disproportionate effect on our findings, Tables 5 and 6 present estimation results when the 
demand series for new products that enter the market during 1994-1999 are deleted from the 
analysis.
15  The sample size is now considerably smaller with 5342 observations for 86 drugs. 
The annual depreciation rate for promotion expenditures is estimated as 0.45 for this sample, 
smaller than for the sample including new products where it was estimated as 0.55, indicating 
that the stock of promotion expenditures depreciates faster for new products. For the model 
without interactions, the steady-state own price elasticity is – 0.31 (s.e. 0.27) for this group of 
drugs, with the cross-price elasticity being 0.14 (s.e. 0.26). So, although the standard errors are 
quite large, the price sensitivity seems higher as compared to the sample with new products 
included. The steady-state own promotion elasticity is 0.39 (s.e. 0.05), whereas the competitors’ 
promotion elasticity is – 0.09 (s.e. 0.07). When prices and promotion expenditures are 
interacted, the estimates for the steady-state promotion effect on the own-price elasticity, 
) 1 /( 2 1 2 r r a - - , is given by 0.098 (s.e. 0.048) which is again very similar to that found before. 
The promotion effect on the cross price elasticity is not significantly different from 0, 
) 1 /( 2 1 6 r r a - - is estimated as –0.022 (s.e. 0.052). For the model with interactions between 
prices and the stock of promotion expenditures, steady-state own price elasticities are again 
reported at various quantiles of the distribution of  proms ln  in Table 6. It is – 0.60 at the 5th 
percentile of  proms ln , - 0.30 at the median and – 0.10 at the 95th percentile.  
 
Table 7 finally presents estimation results for the two samples for a more flexible functional 
form regression model.  This model includes interactions between prices and age and age-
squared to allow for different life cycle price elasticities and further includes a quadratic term in 
the log of the stock of own promotion expenditure. The estimation results indicate that demand 
for products gets less price sensitive at first with age and then more price sensitive when they 
get older, the turning point at around 20 months in the sample with new products. The inclusion 
of the quadratic term in the log of the stock of own promotion expenditure show that there is a 
decreasing increase in the marginal return to own promotion expenditures. Again, for both 
samples, the own price elasticity is smaller for larger promotion expenditures, the interaction 
term   2 a  estimated as 0.021 (se 0.009) and 0.021 (se 0.013) for the sample with and without 
new products respectively. 
 
 
15 The marketing expenditures for new products are still part of promfc and promsc.  
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6  Conclusions 
Using an extension of the model as proposed by Rizzo (1999), we have established that 
promotion expenditures adversely affect the own-price elasticity of drugs, reducing a potentially 
small negative price elasticity to almost zero. The analysis has used data for a large group of 
drugs from different markets. Identification of the promotion effect on the price elasticity of 
demand is due to the introduction of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act, which established that 
Dutch drugs prices became a weighted average of the prices in the surrounding countries. This 
act came into effect in June 1996 and established that prices and promotion expenditures could 
no longer be set simultaneously by the drug producers.  
When considering demand for brand-name drugs for which there are no generic alternatives, 
we find a positive effect of promotion expenditure on the own-price elasticity (i.e. smaller 
price-sensitivity) and a negative effect on the cross-price elasticity, a result that is robust to 
alternative model specifications and the exclusion of new products from the analysis. 
Our results also show that promotion expenditures shift the demand curve outwards, 
indicating that a sizeable proportion of promotion efforts is about establishing market share. A 
long run result we find is that if all companies increase total promotion outlays with 1% then 
total pharmaceutical consumption increases with about 0.2%. From this result we can, however, 
not conclude that the outward shift in the demand curve is socially beneficial or not. To draw 
such a conclusion we would need additional information, such as the optimum level of 
pharmaceutical consumption.    
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Annex 
 
Table 1  Estimation Results, OLS within groups, no generic equivalent 
  Coeff  Se  Coef  Se 
         
1 ln - q   0.6797  0.0552  0.6759  0.0554 
2 ln - q   0.1404  0.0460  0.1390  0.0459 
p ln   0.0109  0.0287  - 0.1816  0.0929 
proms p ln ln ´       0.0161  0.0064 
promf ln   0.0151  0.0044  0.0137  0.0046 
proms ln   0.0386  0.0101  0.0403  0.0106 
pc ln   0.0002  0.0309  0.1048  0.0729 
proms pc ln ln ´       - 0.0102  0.0055 
promfc ln   0.0128  0.0039  0.0122  0.0040 
promsc ln   - 0.0337  0.0073  - 0.0298  0.0071 
100 / 2
m age   - 0.0194  0.0068  - 0.0226  0.0073 
         
55 . 0 = y d      
0644 . 0 = m d      
     
2 R   0.8701  0.8705 
     
# obs  7040 
# drugs  140 
   
Variables that are further included in the model but that are not presented in the table are drug specific dummies, year and month 
dummies, dummies for the period of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act and two further differing, more minor, price regimes, a dummy 
measuring whether a drug required co-payment, and if so the log of the amount of co-payment. 
Reported standard errors are robust to general form of heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 2  Steady-State Elasticities, OLS within groups, no generic alternative 
  No interactions             Interactions                              
  Coeff  Se  Coeff  Se 
         
p   0.0611  0.1626     
) 5 (ln proms p        - 0.2612  0.2342 
) 25 (ln proms p       - 0.0328  0.1800 
) 50 (ln proms p       0.1243  0.1612 
) 75 (ln proms p       0.2167  0.1602 
) 95 (ln proms p       0.2869  0.1647 
promf   0.2991  0.0296     
) 5 (ln proms promf       0.1629  0.0582 
) 25 (ln proms promf       0.2808  0.0290 
) 50 (ln proms promf       0.3197  0.0302 
) 75 (ln proms promf       0.3556  0.0371 
) 95 (ln proms promf       0.4137  0.0543 
pc   0.0013  0.1719     
) 5 (ln proms pc       0.1109  0.2138 
) 25 (ln proms pc       - 0.0334  0.1855 
) 50 (ln proms pc       - 0.1328  0.1867 
) 75 (ln proms pc       - 0.1912  0.1955 
) 95 (ln proms pc       - 0.2355  0.2057 
promfc   - 0.1161  0.0370  - 0.0955  0.0367 
 
The steady state elasticities are presented for various quantiles of promotion. In the lower quantiles drugs are considered with low (or no) 
promotion efforts, whereas higher quantiles include drugs with higher promotion efforts.  
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Table 3  Estimation Results, OLS within groups, no generic equivalent 
  Anti-Hypertension                 Anti-Ulcer                            
  Coeff  Se  Coeff  Se 
         
1 ln - q   0.6503  0.1006  0.4562  0.0676 
2 ln - q   0.1950  0.0803  0.1916  0.0825 
p ln   - 0.4632  0.3526  - 0.8966  0.6426 
proms p ln ln ´   0.0389  0.0242  0.0677  0.0543 
promf ln   0.0122  0.0118  0.0060  0.0121 
proms ln   0.0268  0.0200  0.1459  0.0609 
pc ln   0.9718  0.2231  0.3979  0.4286 
proms pc ln ln ´   - 0.0600  0.0166  - 0.0302  0.0319 
promfc ln   0.0225  0.0112  0.0512  0.0376 
promsc ln   - 0.0319  0.0137  - 0.8751  0.1893 
100 / 2
m age   0.0186  0.0259  0.0256  0.0539 
          2 R   0.9879  0.9946 
   
# obs  2266  648 
# drugs  46  13 
 
Variables that are further included in the model but that are not presented in the table are drug specific dummies, year and month 
dummies, dummies for the period of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act and two further differing, more minor, price regimes, a dummy 
measuring whether a drug required co-payment, and if so the log of the amount of co-payment. 
Reported standard errors are robust to general form of heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4  Estimation Results, OLS within groups, no generic equivalent 
  Cholesterol                            Anti-Depressants                
  Coeff  Se  Coeff  Se 
         
1 ln - q   0.5369  0.0928  0.8444  0.1167 
2 ln - q   0.1693  0.1118  0.0114  0.1200 
p ln   0.0907  0.4660  0.3650  0.1585 
proms p ln ln ´   - 0.0087  0.0368  - 0.0257  0.0121 
promf ln   - 0.0078  0.0099  0.0502  0.0099 
proms ln   0.1553  0.0469  0.0661  0.0195 
pc ln   0.7687  0.7972  - 0.5596  0.5888 
proms pc ln ln ´   - 0.0816  0.0551  0.0209  0.0406 
promfc ln   - 0.0080  0.0178  0.1415  0.0260 
promsc ln   0.1372  0.0872  0.1044  0.1964 
100 / 2
m age   - 0.1226  0.0646  0.0623  0.0186 
          2 R     0.9954    0.9958 
   
# obs    515    642 
# drugs    10    14 
 
Variables that are further included in the model but that are not presented in the table are drug specific dummies, year and month 
dummies, dummies for the period of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act and two further differing, more minor, price regimes, a dummy 
measuring whether a drug required co-payment, and if so the log of the amount of co-payment. 
Reported standard errors are robust to general form of heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 5  Estimation Results, OLS within groups, no generic equivalent, no new products 
  Coeff  Se  Coeff  Se 
         
1 ln - q   0.4393  0.0600  0.4375  0.0600 
2 ln - q   0.4394  0.0611  0.4373  0.0612 
p ln   - 0.0375  0.0333  - 0.1924  0.1107 
proms p ln ln ´       0.0122  0.0071 
promf ln   0.0070  0.0026  0.0060  0.0028 
proms ln   0.0396  0.0110  0.0431  0.0117 
pc ln   0.0168  0.0322  0.0325  0.0755 
proms pc ln ln ´       - 0.0027  0.0055 
promfc ln   0.0126  0.0037  0.0120  0.0036 
promsc ln   - 0.0230  0.0084  - 0.0161  0.0078 
100 / 2
m age   0.0015  0.0060  - 0.0018  0.0064 
         
45 . 0 = y d          
0486 . 0 = m d          
          2 R     0.8362    0.8365 
         
# obs        5342 
# drugs        86 
 
Variables that are further included in the model but that are not presented in the table are drug specific dummies, year and month 
dummies, dummies for the period of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act and two further differing, more minor, price regimes, a dummy 
measuring whether a drug required co-payment, and if so the log of the amount of co-payment. 
Reported standard errors are robust to general form of heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 6  Steady-State Elasticities, OLS within groups, no generic alternative, no new products 
  No interactions                        Interactions                             
  Coeff  Se  Coeff  Se 
         
p   - 0.3098  0.2687     
) 5 (ln proms p       - 0.6024  0.3731 
) 25 (ln proms p       - 0.4394  0.3016 
) 50 (ln proms p       - 0.3026  0.2548 
) 75 (ln proms p       - 0.1854  0.2304 
) 95 (ln proms p       - 0.0976  0.2250 
promf   0.3853  0.0478     
) 5 (ln proms promf       0.2303  0.0938 
) 25 (ln proms promf       0.3653  0.0452 
) 50 (ln proms promf       0.4122  0.0520 
) 75 (ln proms promf       0.4612  0.0711 
) 95 (ln proms promf       0.5285  0.1051 
pc   0.1393  0.2578     
) 5 (ln proms pc       0.0468  0.3024 
) 25 (ln proms pc       0.0097  0.2856 
) 50 (ln proms pc       - 0.0214  0.2869 
) 75 (ln proms pc       - 0.0481  0.2992 
) 95 (ln proms pc       - 0.0681  0.3145 
promfc   - 0.0862  0.0654  - 0.0326  0.0608 
 
The steady state elasticities are presented for various quantiles of promotion. In the lower quantiles drugs are considered with low (or no) 
promotion efforts, whereas higher quantiles include drugs with higher promotion efforts. 
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Table 7  Estimation Results, OLS within groups, no generic equivalent 
  With new products              Without new products           
  Coeff  Se  Coeff  Se 
         
1 ln - q   0.6704  0.0553  0.4339  0.0599 
2 ln - q   0.1446  0.0457  0.4369  0.0612 
p ln   - 0.2831  0.1444  - 0.3627  0.2153 
proms p ln ln ´   0.0206  0.0092  0.0214  0.0133 
promf ln   0.0210  0.0053  0.0108  0.0027 
proms ln   0.2420  0.0364  0.2420  0.0655 
2 ) (ln proms   - 0.0091  0.0017  - 0.0084  0.0024 
pc ln   0.0054  0.0839  - 0.0509  0.0934 
proms pc ln ln ´   - 0.0040  0.0059  0.0024  0.0064 
promfc ln   0.0128  0.0039  0.0124  0.0036 
promsc ln   - 0.0306  0.0084  - 0.0183  0.0107 
100 / 2
m age   - 0.0171  0.0107  0.0026  0.0107 
10 / ln m age p´   0.0902  0.0268  0.0737  0.0255 
100 / ln 2
m age p´   - 0.0225  0.0077  - 0.0141  0.0073 
         
y d     0.50    0.40 
m d     0.0561    0.0417 
          2 R     0.8714    0.8372 
         
# obs    7040    5342 
# drugs    140    86 
 
Variables that are further included in the model but that are not presented in the table are drug specific dummies, year and month 
dummies, dummies for the period of the Pharmaceutical Prices Act and two further differing, more minor, price regimes, a dummy 
measuring whether a drug required co-payment, and if so the log of the amount of co-payment. 
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